The Iran Nuclear Deal: Is It Hurting Global Nuclear Order?

The Iran nuclear deal, which was concluded after years of intense negotiations, provides a framework for addressing its controversial nuclear program. The agreement cuts off Iran's every pathway to a nuclear weapon by placing serious restrictions on its nuclear program and putting in place an unprecedented and robust inspection and verification regime. Though the non-proliferation experts have hailed the agreement for its non-proliferation commitments, the future of the agreement remains uncertain because of Trump administration's vehement criticism against the deal. If the deal collapses because of US withdrawal, it could lead to major non-proliferation crises in the Middle East.

Introduction
The Iran nuclear deal, also known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a nuclear arms control agreement reached between Iran and E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and the high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) on July 14, 2015 after more than two years of serious, multilateral negotiations. The agreement aims to roll back Iran's nuclear program and to block its pathway to nuclear proliferation. Though Iran is a signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has not lived up to its international obligations by carrying out illicit nuclear activities making the international community to impose sanctions on it, which had a devastating effect on the Iranian economy. In a report on Iran's nuclear program released on December 2, 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that "Iran had pursued a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, including a 'coordinated range of activities, relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device'[A]lthough Tehran's organized nuclear weapons program ended in 2003, some activities continued through 2009".¹ The National Intelligence Estimate's (NIE) report on Iran's nuclear program released by the United States in 2007 also made an identical assessment that "Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in fall of 2003" but maintained that the program still poses proliferation threat.² To address Iran's controversial nuclear program and to ensure that its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful, a number of diplomatic proposals were devised between 2005 and 2013, the latest being the Joint Plan of Action reached on November 24, 2013 between Iran and E3/EU+3. The Joint Plan of Action remained in force till October 2015 when it was replaced by JCPOA.

What JCPOA Intends to Do
JCPOA is a very comprehensive agreement running over 159 pages with five annexes. It was concluded on July 14, 2015 and was adopted on October 18, 2015 when the United Nations Security Council passed the resolution 2231 endorsing the deal. The deal entered into force on January 16, 2016, known as the Implementation Day, when IAEA certified that Iran has taken tangible steps to address the military dimensions of its nuclear program. The deal aims to limit Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon but in return promises the removal of crippling economic and financial sanctions imposed on it by the international community. The agreement which was concluded after years of diplomacy is highly technical and has five key components:

Uranium Enrichment
The agreement places severe restrictions on Iran's enrichment capacity. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran is permitted to operate 5,060 centrifuges only at Natanz Enrichment facility for 10 years down from 20,000 centrifuges and the excess centrifuges will be placed under the continuous monitoring of the IAEA. Iran is permitted to operate 1,044 first generation centrifuges at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) but only to produce radio isotopes for agriculture, medicine and industry and no enrichment will take place at FFEP for 15 years and it will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. The agreement seeks to cap Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium at 300 kg for 15 years with an enrichment level not exceeding 3.67%. The excess enriched uranium will be sold in the international market in return for natural uranium (Annex I)³.

Plutonium Production
The agreement cuts off Iran's pathway to plutonium production, a fissile material used to produce nuclear weapons. And for this purpose, Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be redesigned and reconstructed and its core will be filled with concrete, making it unusable for weapons-grade plutonium production in normal circumstances. The spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor will be exported to third world countries. The excess heavy water beyond the needs of Arak reactor will also be shipped out of Iran for 15 years and Iran will not be permitted to build any additional heavy water reactor for 15 years (Annex I)⁴. The agreement also bars Iran from engaging in any spent fuel reprocessing activity for 15 years or construction of any reprocessing facility.

Inspection and Monitoring
The agreement puts in place a robust and unprecedented monitoring and verification regime to prevent any diversion or detect any covert activity. The agreement covers almost every activity of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle from uranium mining to enrichment. The IAEA inspectors will continuously monitor Iran's nuclear program and can any time request for access which Iran has to comply within a period of 24 days. Moreover, Iran has agreed to ratify Additional Protocol which gives extraordinary access to IAEA inspectors to the declared and undeclared nuclear sites. The White House factsheet observes that:

[The IAEA] will not only be continuously monitoring every element of Iran's declared nuclear program, but they will also be verifying that no fissile material is covertly carted off to a secret location to build a bomb. And if IAEA inspectors become aware of a suspicious location, Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which will allow inspectors to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious. Such suspicions can be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms.⁵

Some elements of the inspection regime will expire between 15 to 25 years and some will remain in perpetuity.

Relief from Sanctions
As a reciprocal measure, the UN, the EU and the US are committed to drop financial and economic sanctions imposed on Iran because of its controversial nuclear program. Article 18 of JCPOA states that "The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue." Subsequently, the sanctions on Iran were dropped on the Implementation Day, when the IAEA reported that Iran has met all the preliminary requirements under the agreement, providing a huge relief to the Iranian economy as it led to an immediate release of assets worth billions of dollars which had been frozen overseas. Further, "The EU and its Member States and the US, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA" (Article 29). But the sanctions on missile technologies, conventional weapons and nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the US will remain in place.

Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The pact under Article 36 provides for a dispute resolution mechanism. Any party to the agreement can bring an issue of non-compliance before the Joint Commission, representing all parties which would have to settle the issue within a period of 15 days, this period can be extended by consensus. If the commission fails to resolve the issue within the stipulated time, the issue can be referred to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who have to resolve the issue within 15 days. A complaining participant or the party whose performance is in question could also request that the matter be considered by the Advisory Board, which has to give its non-binding opinion within a period of 15 days. If in spite of all these efforts, the issue remains unresolved, then it can be referred to the UN Security Council.

JCPOA and Non-Proliferation Gains
JCPOA has been hailed as a success story of multilateral diplomacy and 'net plus' for nuclear non-proliferation regime. A statement issued by more than 80 non-proliferation experts underlined that "JCPOA has proven to be effective and verifiable agreement [and] has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran's nuclear programme"⁶ and "any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly."⁷ The agreement puts in place unprecedented safeguards to restrict Iran's nuclear program and cuts off Iran's every pathway to nuclear proliferation. First, it severely limits Iran's ability to enrich uranium, a key element used in the development of a nuclear weapon. In order to develop a nuclear weapon, uranium must be enriched up to 90%. But under the agreement, this is highly impossible as Iran is committed to keep the level of enrichment at 3.6% for 15 years. The agreement also seeks to reduce its stock pile of uranium by 98%. And in this direction, Iran has already taken necessary steps like 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium has been shipped out of the country and two-thirds of the centrifuges have been dismantled and removed.⁸ It is highly impossible for any country to develop an atom bomb with 300 kg uranium with enrichment level below 5%. Second, another key element which can be used to make an atomic bomb is weapons grade plutonium and the agreement blocks this path as well. The only facility where Iranian nuclear scientists could have accomplished this task is the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor but under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to redesign it and its core has been made inoperable, which means that it no longer can produce weapons grade plutonium. Third, the agreement makes it extremely difficult for Iran to covertly develop a nuclear weapon, because the agreement mandates continuous surveillance of every aspect of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, as the former US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power says that the pact includes "[m]ost rigorous inspection regime ever applied to nuclear program".⁹ For this purpose, about 130-150 IAEA inspectors¹⁰ will be working in Iran throughout the year with extraordinary access rights as the former US president Barak Obama puts it '24*7'. Since the Implementation Day, there were two instances when Iran exceeded the limit of heavy water and it was easily detected by the IAEA and the issue was resolved indicating that the inspections and monitoring regime is working satisfactorily. If Iran still tries to cheat, then under the 'snap-back' provisions the sanctions will be reimposed. All these steps have increased Iran's 'breakout time' from 2-3 months to 12 months¹¹ which in itself is a tangible non-proliferation achievement. Before the agreement, Iran, as revealed by the former US Secretary of State was a 'nuclear threshold state' with uranium stockpile sufficient for making 10 to 12 bombs, "was enriching [it] just below weapons-grade and moving rapidly to commission a heavy-water reactor capable of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for an additional bomb or two annually."¹² Under the agreement, Iran has accepted a number of limitations on its nuclear program and has agreed never to "seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon."¹³

What Detractors Say
Though the JCPOA has been greatly applauded by the international community and non-proliferation experts for its non-proliferation commitments and placing tangible restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities, the agreement has also its share of critiques. Two close regional allies of the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia are acting as spoilers and have been calling for scotching the pact altogether. In his speech at the UN General Assembly, Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed: "Fix it or nix it." Michael Oren, the Deputy Minister of Diplomacy in the office of the Israeli Prime Minister said that Iran's missile program poses a serious threat to regional stability and Iran continues to pursue an aggressive regional policy which needs to be addressed and for this purpose a better deal should be negotiated.¹⁴ Radical conservatives in Iran dubbed it as the "most 'shameful' agreement in modern Iranian history" and blamed the Iranian President for making too many concessions.¹⁵ Some experts have also expressed their displeasure over sanctions relief guaranteed under the pact as it would allow Iran to pocket billions of dollars which Iran could divert towards its missile program, funding militia groups in the region and increasing its influence in the region.¹⁶ Among the most vociferous voices against the deal has been the US President Donald Trump. During his campaign trail and even after that he has repeatedly criticized the agreement and has threatened to dismantle it. In his address to the UN General Assembly, he termed it "worst and most one-sided transactions US has ever entered into" and an "embarrassment to US". He further said that "We cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program." He has also accused Iran of violating the 'spirit' of the deal and ultimately 'decertified'¹⁷ the agreement in October. Such a move has put Trump at odds not only with other parties to the agreement but also with key officials of his administration who have repeatedly said that Iran is in compliance and it is in the interests of the US to stay in the agreement. Even the IAEA, the agency in charge of monitoring the agreement has repeatedly certified in its reports that Iran is upholding its obligations under the pact.

For the Trump administration, there are three main concerns which the agreement does not address, thus making it a 'bad deal':

• Iran's Ballistic Missile Program: Iran's ballistic missile program continues to be a cause of concern for the US, but scotching the agreement for the reason that it does not address Iran's ballistic missile program will be a bad idea because the deal is essentially a nuclear non-proliferation agreement and does not cover anything beyond Iran's nuclear program. Though Iran's ballistic missile program surfaced during the negotiations, ultimately it was decided to drop it for two reasons: first, having a ballistic missile program is not illegal; second, missiles pose a threat when loaded with a nuclear warhead and this threat could easily be averted by containing Iran's nuclear program¹⁸ and placing defense sites under international surveillance which no country would agree to and would have been rejected by Iran as well. Besides this, sanctions continue to exist on Iran's ballistic missile program.
• Iran's Destabilizing behavior: Another cause of concern for the Trump administration is Iran's destabilizing behavior as "Iran funds hard-line Shia militias in Iraq that commit human rights abuses against the Sunni minority, helping fuel support for ISIS. It has played a vital role in propping up Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, sending a large contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) fighters and troops from its Lebanese proxy militia Hezbollah. It funds and arms the Palestinian militant group Hamas. It has played a growing role in fueling the Yemeni civil war, sending arms and money to the Houthi militant group that toppled the country's internationally recognized government".¹⁹ A White House statement notes:
  
  "The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to the interests of the United States and to regional stability."²⁰ James Jay Carafano, a foreign policy expert at the Heritage Foundation observes that "Iran is an adversarial power that is working against the vital interests of the region. The deal doesn't make Iran any better, so the deal doesn't serve our interests."²¹ And the Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson who has on a number of occasions said that Iran is fully complying with the agreement says: "[Iran] is violating the larger aspirations of the deal by engaging in destabilizing activities"²² But Iran's behavior can only be corrected by staying in the agreement and working with allies. So far, accusations made by Trump have least impressed other parties of the agreement who have stressed that the deal is working to the satisfaction of all the parties. If the US unilaterally terminates the agreement, it would not only isolate it but will also make Iran more aggressive towards its regional designs. Further, for the international community, Iranian nuclear program was the main issue-an issue on which whole community was united. Adding this or other issues would not only have derailed the negotiations but would also have created divisions and negotiators were not willing to "bargain away certainty on the nuclear issue for anything else."²³
• Sunset" provisions: Critics have also objected to the "sunset" provisions of the agreement under which most of the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program phase out between 10-15 years like the limits on operation of centrifuges, cap on uranium enrichment and uranium stockpile and once these limitations end, Iran will reestablish its weapons program with full strength. So, the agreement only delays and not permanently blocks Iran's march towards a nuclear weapons program and voices have been raised for making these restrictions indefinite. Mark Dubowitz, Chief Executive Officer of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, says that the Trump administration "should insist on conditions making permanent the current restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and the testing of advanced centrifuges and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles"²⁴ The French President, Emmanuel Macron has also expressed his willingness to renegotiate the "sunset provisions" of the pact. It is true that under the "sunset" provision some restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will sunset gradually but it is a misconceived notion to argue that Iran will be free to develop a nuclear weapon because under the agreement, some restrictions will continue for 25 years and some will remain in perpetuity. Moreover, Iran is party to NPT and NPT inspections regime will continue to monitor Iran's nuclear activities as long as Iran remains a member. In addition to this, Iran has agreed to ratify Additional Protocol, and under Additional Protocol no country has gone nuclear. Also, it needs to be acknowledged that no country in the world will ever agree to permanent restrictions on its nuclear program and Iran is a signatory to NPT, and under the terms of the treaty it has every right to all aspects of nuclear fuel cycle.

Conclusion
JCPOA, which was concluded after more than two years of intense negotiations, is a significant achievement for the non-proliferation community. By placing effective restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, the deal has averted what could have been a major nuclear crisis in the Middle East and it is in the interests of all the parties to comply with the agreement. So far, the Trump administration has not been able to build a persuasive case against Iran and if the deal collapses because of Trump's misadventurism it will not only isolate the US but will also make Iran reestablish its nuclear program which could lead to what Kelsey Davenport has called "second major nonproliferation crises". By unilaterally rescinding the agreement, the US will damage its own credibility. It will also raise serious questions regarding its commitment towards non-proliferation and will make it more difficult to address the North Korean nuclear crisis.

JCPOA is currently doing what it was designed to do and the concerns which the US has raised can only be addressed by keeping the agreement intact and using the agreement's dispute settlement mechanism as a forum for further negotiations.

1. IAEA Investigations of Iran's Nuclear Activities," Arms Control Association, p. 3, July 2017, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iaea-investiga tions-irans-nuclear-activities. Accessed on November 22, 2017.
2. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran," Arms Control Association, p. 4, December 2017, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran. Accessed on December 12, 2017.
3. As per the term specified in Annex 1 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA).
4. For details see Annex 1 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
5. Eyder Peralta (July 24, 2015), "6 Things You Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal", available at https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422920192/6-things-you-should-know-about-the-iran-nuclear-deal. Accessed on December 2, 2017.
6. More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Association, September 13, 2017, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2017-iran-deal-experts-statement. Accessed on December 10, 2017.
7. Rick Gladstone (September 13, 2017), "Arms Control Experts Urge Trump to Honor Iran Nuclear Deal," The New York Times.
8. The Historic Deal that will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon", available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/328996. Accessed on December 25, 2017.
9. Michael Rubin (September 26, 2017), "Iran Nuclear Deal Defenders Claim It's the Most Rigorous Nuclear Deal Out There, But the Facts Say Otherwise", Washington Examiner.
10. Sam Jones and Alex Barker (July 14, 2015), "Five Key Points of the Iran Nuclear Deal Explained", Financial Times.
11. The Historic Deal that will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon", op. cit.
12. John F Kerry (September 29, 2017), "The Iran Deal is Working. Here's How We know", The Washington Post.
13. The President's Iran Decision: Next Steps", Testimony given by Philip H Gordon Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, October 25, 2017, available at https://www.cfr.org/report/presidents-iran-decision-next-steps. Accessed on December 10, 2017.
14. Kallol Bhattacherjee (October 10, 2017), "Fix or Nix Iran Nuclear Deal: Israel", The Hindu.
15. Clifton B Parker (2017), "Upholding Iran Nuclear Deal is a Wise Course for US National Interests, Stanford Experts Say", October 12, available at https://news.stanford.edu/2017/10/12/upholding-iran-nuclear-deal-wiser-course-u-s-national-interests-stanford-experts-say/. Accessed on January 1, 2018.
16. James Phillips et al. (July 24, 2015), "The Iran Nuclear Agreement: Yes, There Is a Better Alternative", The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief, No. 4444, p. 1.
17. Under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) US President is obliged to certify every 90 days that Iran is in full compliance with the deal and deal is not hurting US national interests.
18. Fred Kaplan (2017), "Trump Has No Good Reason to Scrap the Iran Deal", September 22, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/09/trump_has_no_good_reason_to_scrap_the_iran_nuclear_ deal.html. Accessed on January 1, 2018.
19. Zack Beauchamp (2017), "Trump's Case Against the Iran Nuclear Deal Has Very Little To Do With Nuclear Weapons", VoX, September 13, available at https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/13/16301160/trump-iran-deal-why-cancel. Accessed on December 28, 2017.
20. Harry Cockburn (2017), "Russia Warns Trump Over Iran Nuclear Deal: US Withdrawal Will Seriously Aggravate Situation", October 13, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-us-iran-nuclear-deal-trump-putin-aggravate-warning-kremlin-stability-security-proliferation-a7998576. html. Accessed on December 12, 2017.
21. Quoted in Zack Beauchamp, op. cit.
22. Quoted in Fred Kaplan, op. cit.
23. John Kerry, op. cit.
24. Bill Powell (2017), "Nuclear Crisis or Art of the Deal? What Happens If Trump Scraps the Iran Nukes Agreement", September 9, available at http://www.newsweek.com/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-north-korea-crisis-european-union-tehran-obama-674875. Accessed on January 2, 2018.

Reference # 55J-2018-04-01-01